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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
There has been a great accumulation of treasury decisions during the
past three or four months, and as a result we are greatly tempted to winnow
out those decisions which seem not to be of general importance. This policy
we hesitate to pursue because there may be accountants who depend upon
The Journal of Accountancy to keep them posted as to all treasury de
cisions bearing on federal income tax that are handed down.
Another reason for hesitating to select those which seem to be of general
importance is the fact that our judgment as to what is of general importance
may be found defective. The fact that The Journal of Accountancy
reaches all parts of the United States and comes under the eyes of account
ants who must meet the various phases of the income-tax law and its
problems makes the work of determining what is of general importance
difficult if not impossible.
We shall, therefore, pursue the policy of publishing all the decisions.
This policy will necessitate a delay sometimes in publishing decisions be
cause of the pressure for space in the Journal. Because of this lack of
space we do not further comment in detail upon any of the decisions published
in this month’s issue, but present the decisions themselves for study and
thought.

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3166. May 19, 1921.)
Trustees in liquidation—Decision of court
1. Trustees as Officers of Court.
Trustees liquidating a dissolving corporation, under direction of the
court, as provided by sections 3447 and 3448 of the general statutes of
Connecticut, are not officers of such court.
2. Legality of Assessment—Restraining Order.
The court, under the circumstances above, has no jurisdiction to pass
on the legality of the assessment of internal revenue taxes or to issue an
order restraining the assessment or collection thereof.
In two recent cases before the supreme court of errors for the state
of Connecticut the trustees in liquidation of the affairs of the Derby
Manufacturing Co. of Derby, Conn., raised the contention that, under
the provisions of the Connecticut law providing for the voluntary
dissolution of corporations, they were properly to be considered offi
cers of the court because they were subject to certain orders of the
court in the final winding up of the affairs of the company. This
matter is of general interest to the internal revenue service and for
that reason the facts involved, together with the material portions of
the opinions handed down by the court, are set forth below.
On February 27, 1919, Joseph Willmann et al., trustees in liquida
tion, petitioned the court for the issuance of an order limiting a period
within which all claims against the corporation should be presented
and for such additional orders from time to time relative to the wind-
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ing up of the affairs of the corporation as might be proper and neces
sary in accordance with the statutes of the state of Connecticut. On
the same date the superior court for New Haven County, Conn.,
issued an order providing that all claims against the Derby Manufac
turing Co. should be presented to said trustees within four months
from February 27, 1919. Among the claims presented pursuant to
this order was one of the United States, presented by James J. Walsh,
collector of internal revenue for the district of Connecticut, for
additional income, excess-profits, and war-profits taxes for the years
1916, 1917 and 1918; and also for taxes not then determined for
that portion of 1919 up to the date of the cessation of business by
such corporation.
On June 1, 1920, the trustees reported the claims of the United
States wherein they disallowed the major portion thereof. The court
entered an order approving the report and providing that written
notice should be given to the United States, through the commis
sioner of internal revenue, and to James J. Walsh, collector, that
unless the disallowed portion of the claim was made the subject of
application to the court for allowance within two weeks, the same
should be barred. Thereafter, the United States attorney for the
district of Connecticut filed a petition on behalf of the United States
for the allowance of the entire claim. On June 29, 1920, the trustees
in liquidation filed with the court an application for a restraining
order against the collector, asking that the collector be restrained
from interfering with their possession of the company’s property,
notwithstanding the fact that there was pending in this office a claim
in abatement covering the taxes in question, during the pendency
of which no distraint proceedings would have been carried out by
the collector. It was alleged that the trustees were officers of the
court and that an interference by the collector with their possession
would be a contempt of the court. Upon the hearing of this appli
cation, the superior court of New Haven County refused to grant
the restraining order. Thereafter, on September 20, 1920, the trus
tees filed another application for a restraining order and for instruc
tions from the court as to the duty of the trustees in relation to such
claims of the United States, and for a hearing by the court to deter
mine what taxes, if any, were due the United States. This appli
cation was made upon the theory that the trustees in liquidation
were officers of the court, in view of the fact that in winding up the
affairs of the corporation they were subject to the orders of the court,
and that, in order that proper instructions might be issued to them
in connection with the government’s claim for taxes, the court should
hear and determine the proper amount due and that the collector
should be restrained from taking any steps to distrain upon the
company’s property in the satisfaction of any sum in excess of
the amount the court should allow. On October 15, 1920, upon
hearing such application, the superior court was of the opinion that
it had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the United
States for taxes and that the assessment of the commissioner of
internal revenue was conclusive upon it. The court directed the
trustees to pay the government’s claim for taxes, authorizing them
to take steps to protect the estate of the corporation by way of claim
for refund and suit to recover back the taxes paid. Judgment was
therefore entered in favor of the United States. From this order and
judgment, and from the order denying the application of the trustees
dated June 29, 1920, an appeal was taken to the supreme court of
errors for the state of Connecticut as above indicated.
Under the Connecticut laws of 1918 (secs. 3446 and 3447), upon
voluntary dissolution of a corporation, upon vote of the stockholders,
the directors are made trustees in the liquidation of the affairs of
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the corporation. Such trustees may apply (sec. 3448) to the superior
court for the county in which such corporation is located for the
limitation of a period for the presentation of claims against the
corporation. Upon the limitation of such a period by the court,
it is provided that such trustees shall proceed to wind up the affairs
of the corporation under the direction of the court in the same manner
as if they were receivers. It is provided (sec. 3449) that any claim
not presented within the time limited shall be barred, unless the
owner thereof shall commence an action to enforce the same within
four months after notice from the trustees of rejection.
The matter was made the subject of two decisions of the court: (1)
Joseph Willmann et al., trustees in liquidation, v. James J. Walsh, collector,
wherein it considered whether such trustees were properly to be
considered officers of the court, and (2) In re application of Joseph
Willmann et al., trustees in liquidation, wherein the court considered
whether the lower court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the
legality of the assessment made by the commissioner of internal
revenue, and whether or not a restraining order should be issued.
The court said in the first case:
The plaintiffs were trustees in liquidation of the company with
such relation to the property as proceedings under the general statutes
(secs. 3447 and 3448) created. The plaintiffs claim that by such pro
ceedings they became receivers of the court in relation to the property
of the corporation, and hence that the property came into the custody
of the law.
The directors of a corporation acting as trustees in liquidation
under general statutes (sec. 3447 only) are obviously not receivers or
officers of the court. If such trustees, in the exercise of their discre
tion, make application to the superior court under section 3448 they
do not thereby change their relation to the property of the corpora
tion; they are still merely trustees in liquidation and not officers of
the court holding the property in the custody of the law.
There are provisions in the statutes and an absence of provisions relative
to the winding up proceedings by trustees under sections 3447 and 3448
which clearly indicate that it was not the legislative intent to make
them receivers by the enactment of section 3448 of the general statutes.
Under sections 3448, 3449, and 3450 the trustees may, in their discre
tion, secure an order of court limiting a time for presentation of
claims. But if a claim so presented is disallowed, the creditor, without
the necessity of securing the permission of the court, must begin an
action to enforce the claim within four months after disallowance.
This course of proceeding differs radically from that pursued upon
the disallowance of a claim in a receivership. Section 3448 of the
general statutes provides that if trustees in liquidation under section
3447 bring an application to the superior court for the limitation of
time within which claims must be presented, they shall still proceed to
wind up affairs of the corporation in accordance with the provisions
of section 3447. The provision of general statutes (sec. 3450) permit
ting a creditor, pending the winding up of proceedings of trustees in
liquidation, to secure the appointment of receivers of the corporation
in liquidation, would be a useless provision if the trustees were already
receivers and subject to the ordinary power of the court to remove its
receivers for good cause shown. There is no provision in the statutes
relating to trustees in liquidation providing that they shall furnish
bonds as is required of receivers by general statutes (sec. 6082).
That the trustees under this section are not, by their application to
the court to limit a time for the presentation of claims, made, by that
act, receivers of the corporation. They are still to wind up the cor
poration in accord with section 3447, but they may secure direction
from the court in the same manner as if they were receivers. Fur-
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thermore, it is hardly conceivable that it was the legislative intent, by
the enactment of section 3448, to permit the directors acting as
trustees, at their discretion, to convert an entire board of directors
into a board of receivers of the superior court with the unnecessary
expense thereby imposed upon the corporation and possibly upon the
creditors.
The winding-up proceedings of a corporation under sections 3447
and 3448, although under the direction of the court, are not the formal
proceedings of a statutory receivership, but are informal proceedings
which do not bring the assets of the corporation into the custody of
the law. The proceedings are similar to those considered in In re
Litchfield County Agricultural Society (91 Conn., 536).
*******
In the second case the court said:
We have held in the companion case heard with this case that the
trustees in liquidation acting under general statutes (secs. 3447 and
3448) are not receivers, and that their possession of the assets of a
corporation is not the custody of the law, and that the assets in their
hands are therefore subject to such procedure for the collection of
taxes in the United States as the laws of the United States permit.
The court, therefore, under this claim correctly refused to issue
the restraining order.
There was further presented to the trial court the request of the
trustees for instructions and for a hearing by the court to determine
what federal taxes, if any, were due.
Under the record and facts found, it appears that the collector of
internal revenue presented claims of the United States for taxes to
the trustees. The trustees in a supplemental report to the superior
court, filed June 1, 1920, reported these claims and stated that there
were five items of such claims and that the trustees had paid two
items and disallowed three items, and recommended the court to dis
allow the three items. The court on the same day, obviously pro
forma, disallowed the three items and ordered notice to be given to
the United States and its collector of internal revenue, as appears in
paragraph 2 of the finding, recited in the preliminary statement. Upon
notice to the collector of such disallowance, he appeared in court and
made application for an order that the claim of the United States for
taxes so disallowed be paid. The collector in his application alleged
that the three items of federal taxes in controversy were “duly assessed
by the proper authority in behalf of the United States.” In the
recommendation of the trustees to the court for the disallowance of
the three items of federal taxes there is no suggestion that such
assessment of federal taxes as made against the corporation, whether
legal or not, was not made by the proper authority of the United
States. The trustees moved that the court proceed to a hearing and
determination of the taxes legally due by the corporation to the
United States. The court ruled that it then had no jurisdiction to
hear and determine the amount of taxes legally due the United States
from the corporation. This ruling of the court was correct.
It is a necessary inference from the finding (par. 6) that the cor
poration had applied to the proper officials of the treasury depart
ment of the United States for the abatement of the taxes objected to.
Upon the record there was no question that the proper officials of the
United States had made an assessment of the taxes in question.
Section 5947 (sec. 3224 R. S., U. S.) of the compilation of the
United States statutes, 1916, provides that:
No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court.
Section 5949 (sec. 3226 R. S., U. S.) of such compilation pro
vides that:
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No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected until appeal shall have been duly made
to the commissioner of internal revenue, according to the provisions
of the law in that regard, and the regulations of the secretary of the
treasury established in pursuance thereof, and a decision of the com
missioner has been had thereon: Provided, that if such decision is
delayed more than six months from the date of such appeal, then the
said suit may be brought, without first having a decision of com
missioner, at any time within the period limited in the next section.
These restrictions are binding upon state courts.—Collector v. Hubbard
(12 Wall., 1), reversing Hubbard v. Brainard (35 Conn., 563).
In Snyder v. Marks (109 U. S., 189, 195), the United States supreme
court held that in regard to the above provisions of the federal statutes—
The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is pro
vided by statute and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The
remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for
it.—Hastings v. Herold (184 Fed., 759).
The facts found disclose that the federal taxes involved in these pro
ceedings have not been paid and that a claim for the abatement of said
taxes is pending before the commissioner of internal revenue, under sec
tion 5949 (sec. 3226, R. S., U. S.) of the compilation of United States
statutes, 1916. Under such facts, in accord with the terms of section 5949
(sec. 3226, R. S., U. S.) no suit, formal or, as here, informal, can be main
tained to recover back or to abate federal taxes in any court, state or
federal. Under section 5947 of such compilation no suit, formal or in
formal, can be maintained to restrain the collection of federal taxes.
Therefore, the superior court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the legality
of the assessment of the internal revenue taxes in question, or to issue a
restraining order relating thereto, because of the provisions of the United
States statutes quoted above.

(T. D. 3170. April 28, 1921.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1916—Decision of court.
1. Income—Dividends Paid in Debenture Bonds.
A dividend paid in debenture bonds of the corporation is income to the
stockholders.
2. Dividends Paid in Debenture Bonds—Distinguished from Stock
Dividends.
Where a dividend is paid in debenture bonds, the stockholders receive
property in the form of securities available for disposition in the market,
and entirely severed or distinguished from their control of the property as
stockholders, which securities call for the payment of cash and do not
invest the holder with merely a different form of holding of stock.
3. Priority of General Creditors over Recipients of Dividend Paid in
Debenture Bonds.
There is no question between persons receiving a dividend paid in
debenture bonds and general creditors where the corporation is solvent,
and any priority one might have over the other is immaterial.
The appended decision of the United States district court, eastern dis
trict of New York, dated March 17, 1921, in the case of Richard R.
Doerschuck v. United States of America and three companion cases, is
published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.

210

Income-tax Department
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
Richard R. Doerschuck, Ralph M. Thomas, Walter J. Doerschuck, George
C. Doerschuck v. United States of America.
[March 17, 1921.]
Chatfield, Judge: The plaintiff in each of the above actions has paid
income tax on one-quarter of an issue of debenture bonds of the North
American Brewing Co., which came into the hands of the plaintiffs because
of the ownership by each of 1,230 shares (or one-quarter) of the entire
capital stock of said North American Brewing Co. The directors of said
corporation had voted an issue of $738,000 of debenture bonds from a sur
plus or undivided profits amounting to $840,368.09, which had accrued
between 1906 and July 1, 1916.
The portion of the bonds representing surplus earned before March 1,
1913, was not taxed, and hence is not involved in these actions. The bal
ance, viz., $262,334.44, was assessed as income for the year 1916, during
which year each of the plaintiffs had received his one-quarter part of said
funds.
In the case of Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S., 189) shares of stock
were issued in the form of a dividend to stockholders, leaving ownership
of the property in the stockholders the same as before the issuance; that
is, the property representing the value of the stock was the same, and the
only change was that each stockholder held two certificates representing
in the aggregate and in theory the same stock value as previously had
been represented by one certificate. It was held in that case that such
stock dividend was not equivalent, for the purpose of income tax, to the
payment of a dividend in property or in cash, and was not to be taxable as
income under the law of September 8, 1916, sections 1, 2, and 3.
The plaintiffs in the present action rely upon the case of In re Fech
heimer Fishel Co. (212 Fed., 357), which holds that debenture bonds, hav
ing the characteristic features of preferred stock, are, from the standpoint
of creditors of the corporation, when the corporation becomes insolvent, no
different than such preferred stock.
It would follow from this that for the purpose of liquidation or disso
lution of the corporation, or for consideration in insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings, such debenture holders would not rank as general creditors.
Plaintiffs also cite the case of Cass v. Realty Securities Co. (148 App.
Div., 96), which held that bonds having a definite date and conditioned as
were the debenture bonds in the present action were for the purpose under
consideration in that case equivalent to preferred stock and should not be
considered as bonds in the usual meaning of that word.
It has been held in Peabody v. Eisner (247 U. S., 347) that a dividend
of shares in another corporation is taxable as income of the corporation
owning the shares and distributing it as a dividend in specie rather than
in money.
In Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert (231 U. S., 399), it was held
that the transformation of ores in a mine into cash proceeds through the
business of mining was a production of income in so far as net profits
were concerned, and that the amount by which the body of ore was reduced
should not be added as a part of the expenses of conducting the business.
This illustrates the difference between the production of income and the
mere changing of form in which capital may be owned by the individual
stockholder.
In Eisner v. Macomber, supra, at page 208, the court says:
The stockholder has the right to have the assets employed in the enter
prise, with the incidental rights mentioned; but, as stockholder, he has no
right to withdraw, only the right to persist, subject to the risk of the
enterprise, and looking only to dividends for his return.
It is apparent, therefore, in the present case that the plaintiffs received
an actual payment (in the form of securities available for disposition in
the market, and entirely severed or distinguished from their control of the
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property as stockholders) of profits which the company wished to dis
tribute as earnings to its stockholders. It did this by distribution of
obligations which, like a promissory note, called for the payment of cash,
and did not invest the holder with merely a different form of holding of
stock.
There is no question here between the persons receiving this dividend and
creditors as to priority of payment. Evidently, so far as these debenture
bonds are concerned, the corporation was solvent; and to whatever extent
they might be of value, this value was separated from any stockholders’
control of the corporation. As stated in Eisner v. Macomber, supra,
at page 212:
It is said that a stockholder may sell the new shares acquired in the
stock dividend, and so he may, if he can find a buyer. It is equally true
that if he does sell, and in doing so realizes a profit, such profit, like any
other, is income, and so far as it may have arisen since the sixteenth
amendment, is taxable by congress without apportionment.
The debenture bonds in the suit at bar fall into the class of stock sold
rather than stock held in a continued status of shareholder.
The complaints should be dismissed.

Herbert Meade Cherry
Lt.-Col. Cherry, president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Manitoba in 1913, died in Shaughnessy military hospital, Vancouver,
July 6, 1921.
Lt.-Col. Cherry went overseas in 1914 with the 8th battalion, C. E. F.,
and after service in France was transferred to the auditor-general’s de
partment in London, where his accounting ability enabled him to render
valuable service to his country.

Richard Mitchell Bateman
Richard Mitchell Bateman, member of the American Institute of
Accountants, certified public accountant of Virginia and member of the
Virginia Society of Public Accountants, died at Norfolk, Virginia, July 23,
1921. Mr. Bateman was well known to accountants in Virginia and neigh
boring states. He was always interested in Institute and society affairs.

Missouri Society of Certified Public Accountants
At the annual meeting of the Missouri Society of Certified Public
Accountants held in Kansas City, June 10, 1921, the following officers
were elected for the ensuing year: president, Edward Fraser; first
vice-president, V. H. Stempf; second vice-president, Page Lawrence;
secretary, F. A. Wright; treasurer, E. H. Wagner.
S. S. Barnard announces the opening of an office at 486 California
street, San Francisco, California.
A. G. Hase announces the opening of an office at 407 Belding
building, Stockton, California.
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